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DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEYS FOR REPRESENTING
INTERESTS ADVERSE TO FORMER CLIENTS*
AN attorney may be disqualifiedI from litigation 2 if his participation
would violate his ethical duty to a former client.3 For the last hundred years
*Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.: In re
Proceedings To Disqualify Robert E. Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
1. Disqualification is used here to describe a court order directing an attorney to
withdraw from a case. E.g., Brown v. Miller, 286 Fed. 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It
is usually granted in response to a motion by a party to the suit, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; but it may be issued on the
court's own initiative, Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (\V.D. Wash. 1946). An
attorney need not be "of record" to be disqualified. Christian v. Waialua Agriculture
Co., 30 Hawaii 533 (1928). And grounds for disqualification prevent emplolment in
the same case in any capacity. Steeley v. State, 17 Okla. Crim. 252, 262, 187 Pac. 8M1,
824 (1920) ; T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., supra at 270. But apparently
only the former client has standing to move for opposing counsel's disqualification. Riley V.
Bradley, 252 Ala. 282, 41 So. 2d 641 (1949). Cf. Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Lovw's, Inc., CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) 1 67725 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (attorney disqualified as to de-
fendants which he had never represented).
The English procedure is a bill in equity to enjoin the attorney's participation.
Rakusen v. Ellis, [1912] 1 Ch. 831 (C.A.) ; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. 261, 34
Eng. Rep. 515 (1815). This procedure is occasionally used in America. Murphy v.
Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 NAV. 110 (1927).
The same questions of law can arise in a suit by a lawyer for his fee, e.g., Hunter
v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 146 N.E. 321 (1924), in an application for mandamus to require
the trial court to allow participation by a specific attorney, e.g., Boyd v. Second Judicial
District, 51 Nev. 264, 274 Pac. 7 (1929), or in an action to declare an attorney con-
structive trustee of property wrongfully acquired, e.g., Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S.
494 (1879).
A disqualification proceeding is not in the nature of a disciplinary proceeding. Brown
v. Miller, suspra at 997. The latter may impose disbarment, c.g., In re Boone, 83 Fed.
944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897), suspension, e.g., In re Marron, 22 N.M. 252, 160 Pac. 391
(1916), or censure, e.g., In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949). And these
disciplinary proceedings require more formal procedures which are often regulated by
statute. See DviNKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 35-41 (1953); PHiLIPs & McCoy, CoDWucr oF
JuDGEs AN LAwYERs 104-18 (1952). See also Potts, Disbarment Proccdure, 24 TE:X.
L. REv. 161. (1946). But improper adverse representation can be the basis of such sanc-
tions. In re Boone, supra; In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 10 Pac. 47 (186); In re
0 - , 73 Wis. 602, 42 N.W. 221 (1889).
2. This note deals only with disqualification in civil cases. Various policies peculiar
to criminal law make the grounds for disqualification of prosecutors less stringent than
grounds for disqualification of counsel in civil cases. People v. Gerold, 265 Ill 448, 107
N.E. 165 (1914). But cf. State v. Lewis, 96 Iowa 286, 65 N.W. 295 (1895). See also
Comment, 60 YAvLE L.J. 626 (1952).
3. A former client may be a natural person or a legal person. People v. Hansun,
290 Ill. 370, 125 N.E. 269 (1919) (school district); Boyd v. Secund Judicial District,
51 Nev. 264, 274 Pac. 7 (1929) (corporation). Where the attorney represented an asso-
ciation, individual members of the association are not considered former clients. Ahmun
v. American Carloading Corp., 312 Ill. App. 225, 38 N.E.2d 362 (1941). But if he was
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courts have been expanding the obligation owed former clients, broadening
the area of employment prohibited to the attorney. 4 At the same time,
developments in legal practice have often made disqualification from even a
small area of employment an increasingly severe sanction.5 The clash of
these two trends in a number of recent cases suggests the necessity of re-
examining the scope of the duty owed by an attorney to his former client.0
Disqualification rules were fashioned at common law to assure the public
that any information confided in an attorney would never be disclosed or
utilized adversely without the client's permission. 7 Such a guaranty was
hired to represent several individuals who maintained they were partners, each individual
is a former client though each might be found to have waived the right to disqualify
because of joint disclosure. Croce v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 2d 18, 68 P,2d 369
(1937). A director of a corporation is not the former client of an attorney who repre-
sented that corporation. Bent v. Priest, 10 Mo. App. 543 (1881): Ferguson v. Alex-
ander, 122 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
The interests of a former client continue after the client's death. Federal Trust Co.
v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655, 247 N.W. 589 (1933). But a former client's interests do not
include the interests of other members of his family. Harvey v. Harvey, 202 Wis. 553,
231 N.W. 580 (1930). And the interests of a predecessor corporation may not include
those of its successor corporations. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113
F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
4. See text at notes 9-20 infra.
The extent of an attorney's obligation to a former client is to be found in statutes
regulating the conduct of the bar, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (1951) ; statutes
prescribing the oath of an attorney, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1603 (1930); A MtR-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, espeC. CANONS 6 and 37
(1947) (hereinafter cited as CANONS) ; and the common law, e.g., Henry v. Raiman,
25 Pa. 354 (1855). In addition the attorney has an obligation to his new client. If the
conflicting loyalties of the attorney to his former and present clients threaten to impair
his proper representation of the new client, he will be disqualified. Hunter v. Troup,
315 Ill. 293, 302-03, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (1924) (dictum) ; Strong v. International Build-
ing, Loan and Investment Union, 183 Ill. 97, 102, 55 N.E. 675, 676-77 (1899) (same).
5. See text at notes 53-55 in!ra.
No statistical survey has been made to determine the number of lawyers or law firms
devoted to specialized fields of law. But an awareness of lawyer specialization and law
firm departmentalization is indicated in BLAUSTEIN, THE A,_RIcAN LAWYER 41-63
(1954). And representation of large corporate clients by these firms is shown in 2
SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM 712-15 (1948). The Swaine book also indicates the trend
towards corporate mergers and law firm specialization.
6. Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.: In re Pro-
ceedings to Disqualify Robert E. Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Fisher Studio,
Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67725 (E.D.N.Y. 1954);
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
7. In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); Kluht v. Mitchell, 199 Iowa
1.163, 199 N.W. 294 (1924); Hatch v. Fogarty, 40 How. 492 (N.Y. 1871).
Waiver by the client of the right to disqualify is operative and is usually the attor-
ney's chief defense. E.g., Gottwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 98 P.2d 481 (1940). The
waiver may either be express, e.g., Wojahn v. Faul, 64 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1954), or
implied, e.g., Harvey v. Harvey, 202 Wis. 553, 231 N.W. 580 (1930). Courts are ex-
tremely reluctant to find waiver where it increases the former client's vulnerability to
criminal liability. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Armour, 125 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
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deemed necessary to encourage maximum disclosure of all relevant facts, a
prerequisite to adequate preparation of a client's case.8 At first, courts dis-
qualified an attorney whenever he was retained 9 against a former client who
could prove that confidential information 10 revealed to the lawyer during the
previous representation would be useful in the present suit." But this placed
too great a burden of proof on the former client because such facts were
difficult to establish. 12  Therefore, courts began to devise rigid evidentiary
rules designed to assure the public that confidential disclosures would remain
inviolate. The courts held that once a client confided any information in his
attorney, the attorney was forever barred from utilizing such information
even if the same information was later available to others from non-con-
1942). And waiver by a former client may not be operative where interests other than
those of the named parties are involved. In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19, 83 A.2d 507 (1951)
(rights of children in a divorce action). It has been suggested that vaiver is insufficient
to discharge the attorney's obligations to the legal profession and to the administration
of justice. Packer v. Rapoport, 88 N.Y.S2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Strong v. Inter-
national Bldg., Loan and Inv. Union, 183 Ill. 97, 55 N.E. 675 (1899).
8. Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392, 395 (1861). See W.H. TAr&r, EThics u.c Snavica
31-32 (1915); A.B.A., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETrics, opinion 91
(1947). Cf. 8 -WVIGIo ., EviDENcE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940).
9. The prohibition of the common law is in terms of taking emplu)ment, Pierce v.
Palmer, 31. RI. 432, 77 At. 201 (1910), and the breach of the duty occurs when the
employment is begun or the retainer is accepted. In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 10 Pac.
47 (1886). CANoNs 6, 36 and 37, speak in terms of accepting emphtyment or accepting
retainers.
10. Information is communicated in confidence whether the client relates it to his
attorney, Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392 (1861), or gives him access to documents con-
taining the information under drcumstances which indicate that the information is not
to be made public. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2t5
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). Information secured by an attorney during an investigation made in
preparation of his client's case is also considered confidential. Hovel v. Minnearolis & St.
L. Ry., 165 Mlinn. 449, 206 N.W. 710 (1926). But cf. Skillman v. McDowell, 317 I1. App.
85, 45 N.E.2d 574 (1942).
"Confidential information" for the purpose of disqualification has been equated with
"privileged communications.' Croce v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 2d 18, 6 P2d 369
(1937). It has been suggested that disqualification is necessary to supplement the client's
privilege to object to disclosure of confidential information. Watson v. Watson, 171
Misc. 175, 11 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Other decisions indicate that "confidential
information" for the purposes of disqualification is broader than "privileged communi-
cation." Packer v. Rapoport, 88 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Brown v. Miller, 286
Fed. 994 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132, 135 (W.D. Wash. 194)
(dictum).
11. Johnson v. Marriott, 2 Cromp. & M. 183, 149 Eng. Rep. 725 (1833) ; Bricheno
v. Thorpe, Jac. 200, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (1821) ; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. 261, 34
Eng. Rep. 515 (1815).
12. Bricheno v. Thorpe, Jac. 200, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (182-1); Beer v. Ward, Jac.
77, 37 Eng. Rep. 779 (1821) ; Messenger v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353, 74 Pac. '410 (1903).
Disqualification attempts have failed in modern cases for the same reason. Butler Bros.
Development Co. v. Butler, 111 Mont. 329, 108 P2d 1041 (1941).
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fidential sources.' 3 They disqualified an entire firm whenever grounds for
disqualification existed against any partner.14 And they developed the doc-
trine that whenever a lawyer was employed against a former client in the
"same matter" as the subject of the previous representation,' 0 the courts
could infer the receipt of confidential information which might be useful in
the present case and could disqualify the attorney involved.' 0
Even when there was no possibility that confidential information would be'
used against a former client, some courts disqualified attorneys who had
represented that client in a related matter.17 These courts feared that unless
they strictly enforced a duty of fidelity independent of the non-disclosure
obligation, the public would not believe that attorneys were exercising their
best efforts on behalf of their clients.'8 If an attorney were allowed to attack
the validity of a contract which he had previously drawn, many would believe
that he had not faithfully served his former client.' 9 Therefore, some courts
13. United States v. Bishop, 90 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937) (information available in
Veteran's Administration records) ; T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113
F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (findings of government antitrust litigation) ; Boyd v. Second
Judicial District, 51 Nev. 264, 274 Pac. 7 (1929) (corporation's secrets known by new
client as well as attorney); Watson v. Watson, 171 Misc. 175, 11 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup.
Ct. 1939) (former client's bad character of public record).
14. Christian v. Waialua Agriculture Co., 30 Hawaii 533 (1928) ; In re Cowdery,
69 Cal. 32, 63, 10 Pac. 47, 65 (1886) (dictum).
15. See, e.g., In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949) ; Purdy v. Ernst, 93
Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429 (1914) ; Gillett v. Gillett, 269 Mich. 364, 257 N.W. 719 (1934);
In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19, 83 A.2d 507 (1951).
A showing that subject matter involved in the present suit is the "same matter" as
that involved in the previous representation may be made apparent by affidavits, Boyd
v. Second Judicial District, 51 Nev. 264, 274 Pac. 7 (1929), pleadings, Brown v. Miller,
286 Fed. 994 (D.C. Cir. 1923), or testimony, People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E.
165 (1914).
16. State v. Rocker, 130 Iowa 239, 106 N.W. 645 (1906); State v. Halstead, 73
Iowa 376, 35 N.W. 457 (1887) ; Gauldin v. State, 11 Ga. 47 (1851).
17. Pierce v. Palmer, 31 Ri. 432, 448-49, 77 Atl. 201, 208-09 (1910); In re Wil-
marth, 42 S.D. 76, 87, 172 N.W. 921, 924 (1919); Barreda Corp. v. Ballenger, 116
S.W.2d 442, 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (dictum). See, generally, DRINKER, LEGOAL
ETHics 109 (1953); THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAw § 174 (1912). Cf. WExs, ATroR-
NEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAw § 271 (1892).
18. In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949) ; In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 35,
10 Pac. 47, 48 (1886) ; Hatch v. Fogerty, 40 How. 492, 500-01 (N.Y. 1871). C1. Fair-
field County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 1.7, 22 Atl. 441, 443 (1891).
The courts have used the term fidelity to describe various obligations owed to former
clients by their attorneys. In Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pa. 354 (1855), and in United States
v. Costen, 38 Fed. 24 (C.C. Col. 1889), the courts discussed the duty of fidelity as if
it were synonomous with the duty of non-disclosure. The duty of fidelity is used in this
note to indicate an obligation of loyalty or faithfulness to the former client's interests
which were the subject of the attorney's previous representation. This obligation exists
apart from the duty to keep confidential information inviolate.
19. Wingilia v. Cushman, 241 Mich. 534, 217 N.W. 909 (1928). A similar situation
existed in Federal Trust Co. v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655, 247 N.W. 589 (1933), where
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prohibited attorneys from opposing former clients whenever the attorney had
been previously consulted concerning the matter involved.20 Here, as well
as when they were attempting to preserve the confidences of clients, courts
were more interested in the public's impression of how these protective rules
were operating than in their actual operation.21 For unless clients were con-
vinced that the doctrines maintained the fidelity and secrecy of attorneys, the
evils which the rules were designed to meet would continue.
In the recent case of Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Management Corporation: In re Proceedings To Disqualify Robert E. Nic-
kerson,22 an expansive construction of the ethical duty owed former clients
would have meant disqualification of an attorney from his principal field of
specialization.23 Nickerson, while an associate of a large New York law firm,
helped represent several major motion picture distributing corporations in
antitrust litigation including the Schine2 -4 and Grifith2/ 3 suits.20  In both
these cases the Government subpoenaed huge quantities of the distributors'
the court refused to allow an attorney to attack a trust arrangement set up in reliance
on his advice.
20. In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944 (C.C.N.D. CaL 1897) (validity of patents); Wutch-
umna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505 (1932) (settlement agreement of
prior suit) ; People v. Hanson, 290 Ill. 370, 125 N.E. 268 (1919) (legality of a school
board). But cf. Alliance Trust Co. v. Hubbard, 87 Ore. 669, 171 Pac. 550 (1918), where
an attorney who drafted a mortgage for a client was subsequently allowed to represent
the mortgagee in a suit on the mortgage against the attorney's former client.
Similar considerations led to the enactment of a federal statute, 62 STAT. 683 (1948),
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 284 (1952), which precludes prosecution of any claim against tie
United States involving any subject matter with which a former government employee was
directly connected through employment or performance of duty. Cf. fmAsoN, BPt.voEIs--A
FREE MANI's LiFE 224-29 (1946), where the author describes the controversy surrounding
Brandeis' switch in the United Shoe Machinery cases.
21. it re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 155, 202 P.2d 902, 903 (1949) ; Fairfield Cunty Bar
v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 Ad. 441 (1890); In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 37, 10 Pac. 47
(1886). See also A.B.A., CANONS OF PaOrSSxON AL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, opinion 71
(1947); N.Y. CouNtY LAwYEms' Assocurtoy YEAanoox 135-37 (1922).
22. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (hereinafter cited as It re Nickerson), 40 A.B.A.J.
1086 (1954).
23. Nickerson specialized in motion picture antitrust law. The Special Master found
that of 18,076 recorded hours of work by Nickerson while in the employment of the firm
of Dwight, Royall, Harris, Koegel and Caskey between August 1942 and October 1950,
over 80% was devoted to motion picture antitrust matters. Special Master's Report,
pp. 3-4, In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
A Special Master was appointed below to hear evidence on the proceedings to dis-
qualify Nickerson. His findings and opinions were adopted by the district court, In re
Nickerson, 1953 Trade Cas. 1 67543 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The Master's report was not
officially or unofficially reported, but it was printed by Appellant as part of his brief
and will hereinafter be cited as' Master's Report.
24. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
25. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
26. Of the eleven corporations involved in the Consolidatcd case, the firm with
which Nickerson had previously been associated had never represented three. Brief fur
Appellant-Respondent, p. 48, In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (hereinafter
1955]
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documents in an effort to establish the existence among all the major dis-
tributors and several large exhibitor chains of a conspiracy to monopolize and
restrain the exhibition of first run films in certain areas. 21 Nickerson's job
was to assist counsel of record to obtain judicial findings of fact that would
make more difficult any subsequent private litigation against the distributors
which his firm represented.28 For this purpose he was given complete access
to the records and files of these clients.29 Two years after the Supreme
Court decisions in Schine and Griffith, Nickerson left the large law firm and
formed a partnership.30 This new firm filed a complaint on behalf of a Wor-
cester, Massachusetts, exhibitor, charging a conspiracy among these distrib-
utors 31 and others 32 to monopolize and restrain the exhibition of first run
films in fifteen major cities including Worcester. None of these cities had
been involved in Schine or Griffith, but the specific trade practices alleged to
result from an unlawful conspiracy were identical to the ones litigated in
those cases.3 3 All defendants moved 34 to disqualify Nickerson and his firm
cited as Brief for Appellant). There was no proof below that the firm had ever repre-
sented two others. Ibid. And of the six remaining corporations the Dwight firm served
as general counsel to only Twentieth Century-Fox during the entire period of Nicker-
son's employment. Id. at 3. The five remaining corporations occasionally retained the
Dwight firm. They were Loew's, Inc., Paramount Pictures, Inc., RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., United Artists Corporation, and Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. These five were
referred to by the Appellant as the "group." Id. at 54. Nickerson participated in three
cases in which the firm represented the "group" as well as Fox. In addition Nickerson
devoted over 1500 hours to work involved in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948), in which the Dwight firm was retained only by Fox and its sub-
sidiaries. Brief for Appellant, app. p. 14.
27. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 922, 923 (2d Cir. 1954).
2& Id. at 922.
29. Ibid.
30. The Schine and Griffith cases were decided by the Supreme Court on May 3,
1948. The Griffith case was relitigated on remand and decision was pending in 1950.
Nickerson left the Dwight firm on October 1, 1950. The complaint in the Consolidated
suit was filed on April 6, 1951.
31. Fox and the "group." See note 26 supra.
32. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corporation, Universal Pictures Company,
Inc., United Paramount Theatres, Inc., Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation, Paramount
Pictures Corporation.
33. The practices alleged in the complaint were those found to have existed among
the distributors and privileged exhibitors in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948). Many of the same practices had been litigated in the Schlinc and
Griffith cases in which Nickerson also participated. These practices included the mo-
nopolization and restraint of the exhibition of first run quality films in violation of the
Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1952), by means of
master agreements whereby the favored exhibitors were permitted to utilize their mass
buying power to deprive competitors of first and subsequent runs and were granted ex-
clusive privileges in the exhibition of films. Compare Complaint, pp. 20-29, It re Nicker-
son, 1953 Trade Cas. ff 67543 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) with Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 113-16 (1948) and with United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S,
100, 101-04 (1948).
The complaint differs from the Schine and Griffith cases in that additional conspira-
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for breach of his ethical duties as now embodied in Canon Six of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of The American Bar Association. °
tors are named and the practices are alleged to have occurred in various major cities
throughout the United States rather than in restricted geographic areas.
34. Twentieth Century-Fox and Paramount Pictures, Inc. moved to disqualify Nick-
erson on May 15, 1951. On January 29, 1953, after hearings before the Special Master,
the nine other defendants appeared in the proceedings. Brief for Appellant, pp. 11-13.
35. CANo.- 6 reads in part as follows:
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and siot to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
In Nickerson the Second Circuit held that CANoN 6 was properly applicable to the
facts of that case. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954). The Canon was
based on §§ 21 and 22 of the Alabama State Bar Association Code of Ethics. 31 A.B.A.
REP. 698-99 (1907). Alabama § 22 states: "The duty not to divulge the secrets of clients
extends further than mere silence by the attorney, and forbids accepting retainers ...
[in certain matters] about which the confidence was reposed. When the secrets or con-
fidence of a former client may be availed of ... [possibly to harm the former client
in a later suit] the attorney cannot appear in such cause without the consent of his for-
mer client" Prior to 1908, eight state associations adopted the Alabama rule verbatim,
Id. at 699. The A.B.A. version inserts the phrase "the obligation to represent the client
with undivided fidelity" in addition to the duty not to divulge informatiun. The drafts-
man's intent seems to have been the creation of two duties: (1) not to divulge certain
information, and (2) the obligation of fidelity. In terms of the Canon both duties enjoin
attorneys from accepting certain types of future employment. See Dni-:nm, LEg.%L
ETHIcs 109 (1953); 26 Rocx- MT. L. REv. 195 (1954). See also the cross-reference
of CANoN 6 to Hoffman's Resolution VIII provided by the A.B.A. committee that drafted
the Canons. 33 A.B.A. RaP. 586 (1908). This Resolution prohibits taking emplyment
against a former client in the same "cause" and nowhere mentions secrets or confidences.
31. A.B.A. REP. 719 (1907).
Since 1924 the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American
Bar Association has published official advisory opinions on proper professional conduct.
Of the 287 published opinions 274 appear in A.B.A, CANONS OF PRoFEsSIONAL ANr
JuDImCaL ETHIcs (1947). The remaining appear in the A.B.A. Journals. An additional
300 rulings were authorized for publication in 1952. DRI1xEm , op. cit. supra at 31.
Similar advisory opinions have been published by the Ethics Committee of the New York
County Lawyer's Association, The Association of the Bar of New York, and the Michi-
gan Bar Association. Several other states and local bar associations were contemplating
publication in 1952. Id. at 31, 32. For a classification of committee opinions construing
CAN oN 6, see id. at 103-30, 298-99.
36. Rule 5(c) incorporating the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association as the official rules of the court "was adopted by the Judges of the United
States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York pursuant
to an order entered February 6, 1952 with effective date at the beginning of business on
March 1, 1952." Letter from Clerk of the Southern District Court to the Yale Law
Journal, Oct. 29, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library; 16 Fmn. RuL.Es SE v. 9S03 (1952).
As of 1952, 25 states had bar associations established on an integrated basis. In
these states, membership in the state bar association is a prerequisite to practice. All
these states have a code of professional ethics promulgated by the state supreme court
(in 15), by action of the state bar association (7), by statute (2), or by other means.
Although some of the codes differ in wording their general effect is similar. See PHIL-
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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's disqualification of Nicker-
son 37 as to those defendants which had retained the New York firm for anti-
trust matters during the time Nickerson was employed by that firm.38 The
court feared that if Nickerson were allowed to continue in the case he might
be able to utilize confidential information acquired during his previous re-
lationship with the five named defendants. It inferred that Nickerson had
received confidential information because of his access to the defendants' files
during the Schine and Griffith litigation. And, due to the similarity in sub-
LIPS & McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 13-14 (1952) ; BLAusTiN & PORTER,
THE AmERICAN LAWYER 240 (1954) ; DRINKER, Op. cit. supra note 35, at 20-21. For a
brief but fully explanatory article on integration, see Wicker, Intcgrated Bars, 21 TNN.
L. REv. 708 (1951).
In the other 23 states, and the District of Columbia, which have voluntary bar asso-
ciations, three have codes adopted by the state supreme court, fifteen have codes adopted
by the state bar association, and two states have otherwise promulgated their codes.
PHILLIPS & MCCOY, Op. cit. supra at 15; BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, op. cit. supra at 241.
The Canons have been occasionally cited by the courts but until recently no decision
attempted to construe their text. Usually courts assumed that they restated generally
accepted ethical standards. E.g., In re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 902 (1949)
Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 487, 159 N.E. 495, 496-97 (1928). The first judicial
construction of CANON 6 occurred in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113
F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
37. The original application sought disqualification of Nickerson's new partner Wil-
liam Gold as well as of Nickerson and the firm. Memorandum on Behalf of Twentieth
Century-Fox and Paramount Pictures, p. 1, In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1954). The Master found that Gold was disqualified "on the principle that this dis-
qualification of his partner, Nickerson, necessarily disqualifies the firm." Master's Re-
port, p. 25. See note 14 supra. But Gold's qualifications were stipulated to be outside the
scope of the proceeding when it came before the district court and that court confirmed
disqualification only as to Nickerson and the firm of Gold and Nickerson. In re Nicker-
son, 1953 Trade Cas. I[ 67543 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). This disqualification was affirmed by
the Second Circuit. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 928 (2d Cir. 1954).
38. Nickerson was disqualified as to five defendants. They included Fox and the
"group" as defined in note 26 supra, with the exception of United Artists Corporation.
In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 928 (2d Cir. 1954). United Artists retained the Dwight
firm in the Griffith and a related case but did not in the Schinc case. Brief for Appellant,
app. pp. 12-13. Either the omission was a clerical error or the Schine representation
was considered determinative. Since the Schine and Griffith cases involved substantially
related matters, the latter hypothesis seems unjustified.
Upon Nickerson's disqualification as to the "group" it became necessary for him to
withdraw from the entire suit because, as a practical matter, it would have been im-
possible to prove a conspiracy among only those distributors which had never been
represented by the Dwight firm. The partnership of Gold & Nickerson was dissolved
on March 31, 1953, as a result of the Master's decision, leaving Gold free to continue
in the case. Brief for Appellant, p. 13. In Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., CCH T"Dr
REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 1 67990 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), the court held that where ,I and
the firm of A and B have been disqualified from representing plaintiff exhibitor in a treble
damages private antitrust action due to A's previous relationship with some of the de-
fendents, attorney B and his new firm of B and C are qualified to continue the action on
behalf of the plaintiff as the prior disqualification related only to A individually and to
the firm of A and B. Attorney B in this case is in the same position as Gold in Consolidated.
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ject matter between those cases and the present one,39 the court concluded
that this information would be useful. 40 Thus, it found a basis for disqualify-
ing Nickerson by adopting the common law device of inferring the receipt of
useful confidential information from the similarity in subject matter of past
and present representations.41
The court refused, however, to adopt the common law fidelity rule as a
reason for precluding Nickerson's participation in Consolidated. The district
court had applied the fidelity rule in its broadest aspect: it categorized past
controversies over the existence of a conspiracy in terms of distributor as
against exhibitor interests and held that since Nickerson had spent eight
years attempting to prove that there had been no conspiracy among the dis-
tributors he could not now attempt to prove the contrary.- Therefore, the
district court disqualified Nickerson against all the defendants in Consoli-
dated. The Second Circuit rejected this approach and refused to bar Nicker-
son from representing exhibitors against distributors other than those which
had been represented by Nickerson's employer in Schine and Grifith 43
The Court of Appeals took a moderate position concerning the attorney's
39. See notes 15 and 33 supra.
40. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1954).
41. See notes 15 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
The defendant-petitioners originally based their motion to disqualify Nickerson on the
ethical obligations implicit in CANONS 6 and 37 and the common law. Their contentions
were accepted by the Master. Master's Report, pp. 2, 15-16. In his report no single
standard was utilized as a basis for the decision.
CANON 37 provides in part: "It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's con-
fidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his em-
ployees; and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve
the disclosure or use of these confidences either for private advantage of the lawyer or
his employee ... ." The obligations described are similar to those specified in paragraph
3 of CANON 6. See note 35 supra. Nickerson argued that only CANoN 37 was applicable
to the proceedings because CAxoN 6 requires a personal relationship in which the client
directly reposes confidence in the skill of the attorney, and since he had merely been an
employee of the Dwight firm, no confidence had been reposed in him. Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 37-41. This argument was expressly rejected by the Second Circuit. In re
Nickerson, 216 F2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1954).
42. Indeed, the Master may have intended to disqualify Nickerson frum ever bring-
ing antitrust actions against any movie distributor in any part of the country. He said:
"Nickerson's counsel apparently assumes that each of the anti-trust cases in which he
participated were in local areas and that the facts . . . could have no bearing on an
entirely different area, Worcester, Massachusetts ..... These cases . . . do not . . .
represent local trials involving local issues. They are part and parcel as alleged of a
nationwide conspiracy in which many of them are specifically mentioned as illustrations
of the conspiracy itself. ... What, in fact, he [Nickerson] is doing is shifting from one
side of a controversy to the other, and to make available the knowledge and experience
to which he has been 'exposed' as to the 'actual operation of these trade practices which
he had acquired in eight years from the producers' side of these issues to that of one of
their opponents." Master's Report, pp. 21-22.
43. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 928 (2d Cir. 1954).
In Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., CCH TRADE R.W. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67725
(E.D.N.Y. 1954), an attorney was disqualified for representing interests adverse to the
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duty to former clients. It recognized that the fidelity duties inherent in Canon
Six would be enforced in a proper case.44 On the other hand, it did not fully
effectuate the policy underlying the protection of confidential information.
The court suggested the possibility of utilizing an in camera hearing at which
the former client would be required to prove that the attorney had received
useful confidential information.40  But such a procedure would force the
client to disclose confidential information which the attorney-client privilege
is supposed to guard even from the trial judge.40 And if an attorney and
client have sustained a professional relationship over a long period of time,
many confidences reposed in the attorney may be forgotten by the client.
Although the client may therefore be unable to prove the existence or specific
nature of such communications, the information confided might give even a
good faith attorney an advantage in the present litigation. 47 Had the Second
clients of the firm which previously employed him. And although there was evidence
that only some of the defendants were his former clients, the court disqualified the at-
torney as to all defendants. The decision was based on two factors. First, all the de-
fendants were found to have acted more or less in concert and had conferred about their
mutual interests. Secondly, the information obtained by the attorney was so interwoven
that segregation was impractical. This rationale had been rejected previously in T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the
court limited disqualification to a single defendant although there was evidence inferring that
a mutual interest existed among all the defendants in the past.
44. Nickerson argued that "the responsibility exemplified by the three paragraphs
of Canon 6 is far broader and more restrictive than the mere duty not to divulge
secrets (which is covered by Canon 37)." He described CANON 6 as creating a fidelity
duty but maintained that he was immune from the obligation because he was not a
partner of the Dwight firm and hence no confidence was reposed in him. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 37-41. The petitioners, on the other hand, merged the CANON 6 and 37
obligations drawing no distinction between them. Brief for Appellant, pp. 14-22. The
Second Circuit accepted Nickerson's contention that CANONS 6 and 37 should be con-
sidered independently. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954). Tile facts of
the instant case only necessitated applying the confidential information aspect of CANON
6, but in no place was the fidelity duty negated.
45. In re Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). But the court did not fol-
low its suggestion in the principal case because of the complex issues of fact and law
involved and the great burden which would have been necessary for the petitioners to
sustain. The hearing idea was suggested as early as 1821. See Bricheno v. Thorpe, Jac.
200, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (1821).
46. See note 10 supra.
The court in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), said in considering the same problem: "To compel the client to show, in
addition to establishing that the subject of the present adverse representation is related
to the former, the actual confidential matters previously entrusted to the attorney and
their possible value to the present client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn
about the lawyer-client relationship. For the court to probe further and sift the con-
fidences in fact revealed would require the disclosure of the very matters intended to
be protected by the rule. It would defeat an important purpose of the rule of secrecy-
to encourage clients fully and freely to make known to their attorneys all facts pertinent
to their cause."
47. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), Note, 26 RocKY MT. L. Rav. 195 (1954).
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Circuit favored a broad application of the confidential information rule, it
would have undoubtedly emphasized the special problems which arise in anti-
trust cases where the issue of conspiracy is the subject matter of the present
as well as the previous representation. In order to insure the maximum flow
of information to counsel it would seem necessary to allow defendants to dis-
qualify any attorney who in the past had represented their co-conspirators in
joint litigation.48 In the instant case, for example, Nickerson interviewed
co-defendants of his firm's clients, and it may be inferred that in the interests
of a joint defense he obtained information which would not have been given
to opposing counsel or to a Government investigator.40 But apparently the
Second Circuit did not feel that these considerations merit disqualification
against such co-defendants in every case.
Several important public policies must be considered whenever a motion
is made to disqualify an attorney for representing interests adverse to those
of a former client. The policy of maintaining public confidence in the in-
violate nature of confidential communications to attorneys and in the fidelity
of attorneys to their clients' interests highlights only one aspect of the prob-
lem. Modern discovery procedures are based on the desirability of making
available to litigants all the facts necessary for a full presentation of their
case.50 Privileged communications are immune from discovery because the
harm involved in their suppression is believed to be outweighed by the utility
of promoting free communication to counsel. 1 But contemporary decisions
have narrowed the area of privilege in the quest for complete disclosure of
48. This doctrine was suggested in Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., CCH Tamz REC.
RFP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67725 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
49. The Master found that during the Griffith litigation Nickerson interviewed em-
ployees of Paramount, Fox, and Metro. Master's Report, p. 6. During the Scline case
Nickerson had interviews with office attorneys of the defendants. Id. at 9-10. During
the Paranwunt case Nickerson collaborated with the other defendants against whom
charges had been made. Ibid.
The Second Circuit failed to disqualify Nickerson as to six of the eleven defendants.
See notes 31 and 38 mipra. Four of these six were affiliates, subsidiaries, or successors
of those defendants against whom Nickerson was disqualified. Paramount Pictures
Corporation and United Paramount Theatres, Inc. were both successors of Paramount
Pictures, Inc. Brief for Appellee, p. 7, h re Nickerson, 216 F2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corporation was a 100% subsidiary of Warner Bros.
Pictures, Complaint, para. 8, In re Nickerson, 1953 Trade Cas. U 67543 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The Second Circuit apparently ignored the close corporate relationship among these
alleged conspirators. This was also implicit in T.C. Theatre, Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where on rehearing Judge Weinfeld implied that
disqualification of the attorney against Paramount-Publi:% Corporation vould not mean
disqualification against its successor. The Second Circuit in the principal case found
there was no parallel between the situation in T.C. Theatr', Corp. and Wichersaon. In re
Nickerson, 216 F.2d 920, 924-25 n.4 (2d Cir. 1954). But there is a parallel as to those
defendants in Nickerson which are the corporate successors of the "group."
50. 4 Mcoax, FxEDEAL PRAcrncE f 26.02 (2d ed. 1950); McCoaMic, Ev1rmjZc § 3
(1954) ; Note, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 269 (1948).
51. McCoamicK, op. cit. supra note 50, §§ 91, 93; 8 WIGMom, Evinrza= § 2291 (3d
ed. 1940).
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all relevant information. 52 A formulation of the attorney's ethical obligation
which allows a former client to disqualify an attorney who has never received
any confidential information useful in the present suit may unnecessarily re-
strict other parties from access to the legal talent most familiar with the facts
of their case. Such a formulation may also unreasonably restrict access to
attorneys specializing in technical areas of law. And in the antitrust field,
where private actions are a means of enforcing national policy, these un-
necessary restraints frustrate the implementation of public policy as well as
the vindication of private rights.53 Furthermore, the attorney's right to
develop a special skill free from unwarranted limitations as to employment
must be recognized. 54 Since large areas of business endeavor are now con-
trolled by a few corporations, an attorney has only a few prospective clients
to serve in certain fields.55 Many young lawyers receive their initial training
as associates of the large law firms which represent these corporations. If
they are readily vulnerable to future disqualification by the firm's clients in
these limited areas of practice, the consequence is a serious restriction upon
their careers.
Ruling on a motion to disqualify an antitrust attorney who has switched
from defending movie distributors to representing exhibitors requires the
application of different principles than would ruling on a motion to disqualify
a lawyer attempting to break a contract previously drafted by him. The
Second Circuit was sound in restricting its decision in Nickerson to the type
of case before it without negating the other standards implicit in the Canons
of Professional Ethics. Unfortunately, it did not clearly articulate the basis
for its holding. Unless courts delineate the various policy considerations
motivating their decisions, precedents offer little guidance" to attorneys seek-
ing to fulfill their ethical obligations."0
52. See McCoRmicIC, op. cit. supra note 50, § 81. Compare h re Selser, 15 N.J.
393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954), commented on in 77 N.J.L.J. 192, 196 (1954), with Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507 (1947), discussed in 4 MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.23[8] (2d ed. 1950).
53. Glen Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Fanchon
& Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
54. See Rakusen v. Ellis, [1912] 1 Ch. 831, 839, 841 (C.A.). But cf. In re Nicker-
son, 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954).
55. For example, the court found in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 167 (1948), that 70% of all the first run theatres in the 92 cities with popu-
lations over 100,000 were affiliated with one or more of the five major distributors. See
F.T.C., REPORT ox THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTivE FACILITIES (1947), for a repre-
sentative coverage of the control of various areas of business activity by a few large
corporations.
56. In the instant case, upon leaving the Dwight firm, Nickerson sought advice as
to the extent of his obligation to his employer's clients. And he relied upon this advice
in prosecuting the Consolidated complaint. Brief for Appellant, pp. 18-19. Similarly,
other attorneys have unsuccessfully attempted to ascertain the extent of their duty to
former clients. See, e.g., Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1916) ; In re
Boone, 83 Fed. 944, 963-64 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); Sheffield v. State Bar, 22 Cal. 2d
627, 631-32, 140 P.2d 376, 379 (1943).
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